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as a means for measuring damages arising from another cause of action,4 such as negligence or
malpractice. Finally, other courts have refused to recognize deepening insolvency altogether.5
This Article discusses the three different approaches courts have taken when interpreting
the theory of “deepening insolvency.” Part I discusses the history of the doctrine of “deepening
insolvency.” Part II discusses the case law recognizing “deepening insolvency” as a separate
cause of action. Part III discusses the case law recognizing “deepening insolvency” as a means of
measuring damages. Part IV discusses the case law that refuses to recognize “deepening
insolvency” altogether. Finally, Part V discusses the implications of each of the three views of
“deepening insolvency.”
I.

The History of Deepening Insolvency

Deepening insolvency claims can be traced back to two cases from the early 1980s
regarding the in pari delicto defense. In the first case, In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York
Securities Litigation,6 a bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the debtor’s auditor, on behalf of the
bankruptcy estate, for “issuing an unqualified audit opinion on allegedly false financial
statements.”7 In its decision, the Investors Funding court opined that prolonging the existence of
a corporate debtor is not always a benefit to the debtor.8 Indeed, the Investors Funding court
emphasized that “A corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be presumed that any
act which extends its existence is beneficial to it.”9 Therefore since the prolonged existent
insolvency of the debtor duly benefitted the “principal officers, controlling directors, controlling
4

Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006) aff'd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
5
Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., No. 04-CV-4971 NG MDG, 2014 WL
2594340, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014)
6
In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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stockholders” of the debtor and their confederates, the investors Funding court refused to impute
such parties’ knowledge and conduct to the debtor.10 Shortly thereafter, in Schact v. Brown,11 the
Seventh Circuit held that under Illinois law, there was no restriction on prohibiting a corporation
from suing to recover damages resulting from the fraudulent prolongation of its life past
insolvency.12 In so holding, the Schact court emphasized that because “the corporate body is
ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor
liability.”13
The theory of deepening insolvency, which is an outgrowth of these two cases,
challenged the concept that a corporation always benefitted from prolonging its existence. While
courts generally agree with this proposition, courts have split over the appropriate view of the
doctrine of deepening the insolvency. As noted above, some court have held that there is a
separate tort cause of action for deepening insolvency. Other courts have held that the doctrine of
deepening insolvency provides a measure of damages arising from another cause of action, such
as negligence or malpractice. Finally, other courts have refused to recognize deepening
insolvency as either a separate cause of action or as a measure of damages.
II.

Deepening Insolvency as a Separate Cause of Action

Some courts recognize the theory of deepening insolvency as a separate cause of action,
sounding in tort.14 This recognition presumes that, “in taking on additional unpayable debt, a
corporation might be harmed by operational limitations, strained corporate relationships,

10

Id.
Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
12
Id.
13
Schact, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350.
14
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 351.
11

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439

3

diminution of corporate assets, and the legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy.”15 A cause
of action for “deepening insolvency” generally contains 3 elements: (i) fraud, (ii) which further
expands corporate debt, (iii) and also prolongs the life of the insolvent corporation.16 While most
courts require a finding of fraud, some courts have accepted negligence as being sufficient.17
Furthermore, in addition to fraud or negligence, in order to create a valid cause of action for
“deepening insolvency,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant(s) proximately caused
the plaintiff’s damages.18
For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. & Lafferty Corporation, Inc.,19 held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would recognize “deepening insolvency” as a separate cause of action.20 In so holding, the
Lafferty court relied on decisions from other jurisdictions,21 and the policy of Pennsylvania’s tort
law, to predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find “deepening insolvency” to give
rise to a cognizable injury.22
William Shapiro owned the defendant corporation, Walnut Associates, Inc. (“Walnut”),
which in turn owned Walnut Equipment Leasing Company, Inc.23 In 1986, after experiencing
financial difficulties, Walnut created Equipment Leasing Corporation of America (“ELCOA”) as

15

Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 2012 PA Super 102, 46 A.3d 737, 752 (2012).
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 351.
17
Id.
18
Marion v. TDI Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 150 (3rd Cir. 2010).
19
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 351.
20
Id.
21
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 351; (citing Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir. 1983);
see also Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 853 (M.D. La. 1997); see also Allard
v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (USA), 924 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
22
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 351.
23
Id at 360
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a financing subsidiary, in order to raise money.24 ELCOA was wholly owned and operated by
Shapiro, and was created for the sole purpose of providing as a platform to “sell debt securities
though a new company with a clean financial picture.”25
The Shapiro family allegedly lied about the financial positions of ELCOA and Walnut,
persuading companies to register, offer, and sell additional debt certificates, leading many
investors to purchase the ELCOA debt certificates. 26 The Shapiros, then, moved this newfound
capital into Walnut.27 Most importantly, the issuance of these debt securities further deepened
the insolvency of Walnut and ELCOA, ultimately forcing them both into chapter 11
bankruptcy.28 The Bankruptcy Court appointed a chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee, who in turn
appointed the official creditors’ committee to assert the claims on behalf of the debtor
corporations.29
The appellant was the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which was appointed
by the bankruptcy trustee (which was authorized by stipulation) to assert claims on behalf of the
debtor corporations.30 On February 1, 1999, the creditors’ committee, having most of the powers
of the bankruptcy trustee, commenced a civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, against the Shapiro family and their co-conspirators, including Lafferty, an
outside professional. 31 The complaint accused the defendants of mismanagement of the debtors
and operating Walnut and ELCOA as a Ponzi scheme.32 Specifically, the creditors’ committee

24

Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 344
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id at 345.
28
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 345.
29
Id at 344.
30
Id.
31
Id at 345.
32
Id.
25
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alleged that ELCOA was deceitfully marketed as an independent business entity, when in reality
it was part of a network of businesses owned and operated by the Shapiro family, that were set
up to acquire leases from Walnut and to sell debt certificates to raise money.33 The creditors’
committee further alleged that this ultimately increased debtors’ debt load, thereby forcing them
into bankruptcy.34 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the creditors’
committee was barred from suing them under the doctrine of in pari delicto.35
The district court dismissed the claims against the Lafferty only, “reasoning that, ‘[s]ince
it is pleaded that the [D]ebtors, acting through the Shapiros, perpetrated the Ponzi scheme the
doctrine of in pari delicto bars [the creditors’ committee] from suing these defendants for claims
arising out of the fraud.’”36 The district court never made a decision on whether it recognized
deepening insolvency as a separate tort. The committee appealed the dismissal of its claims
against Lafferty, thereby requiring the Third Circuit to analyze whether to recognize deepening
insolvency as a separate cause of action under Pennsylvania law.37
Prior to Lafferty, no court in Pennsylvania had addressed the issue.38 Thereafter, the Third
Circuit had to predict how Pennsylvania courts would rule if confronted with the issue.39 The
Third Circuit mainly relied on the underlying policy of Pennsylvania tort law and decisions from
other jurisdictions regarding deepening insolvency and concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would rule that “deepening insolvency” to give rise to a cognizable injury.40 The Third

33

Id.
Id.
35
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 345.
36
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 344 (quoting Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. William
Shapiro, et al., No. 99–526, slip op. at 11, 1999 WL 729267 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 8, 1999).
37
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 346.
38
Id.
39
Id at 349.
40
Id.
34

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439

6

Circuit came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the court found the theory of deepening
insolvency itself to be reasonable.41 Under bankruptcy law, a corporation is considered insolvent
when a corporation’s debt exceeds the fair market value of its assets.42 The Third Circuit
reasoned that, even when a corporation is insolvent, however, corporate property still has value,
and therefore the concealment and furtherance of debt can damage such value.43 Second, the
Third Circuit opined that simply prolonging the life of an insolvent corporation can further
damage to such value because an increase in bad debt can cause the further dissipation of
corporate assets.44 Therefore the Third Circuit noted that further harm can be avoided, and the
value of an insolvent corporation can be preserved, if the corporation is dissolved promptly,
rather than being fraudulently prolonged.45 Whereas contract law tries to put the non-breaching
party back in the position he or she was in prior to the breach, here, the court concluded that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would want to put the harmed parties in a “deepening insolvency”
situation back into the position they were in prior to the fraudulent incurrence of more debt.46
The recognition of deepening insolvency as a cause of action, however, does not
necessarily mean that a court will also recognize deepening insolvency as a valid theory of
damages for an independent cause of action. For example, in In re CitX Corporation.,47 Inc., the
Third Circuit emphasized that it never held “deepening insolvency” as a valid theory of damages
for an independent cause of action.48 Likewise, the Third Circuit stated that its conclusions in

41

Id.
Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 349.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Kirschner, 46 A.3d 737, 752. (Citing Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX
Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir.2006)).
48
Id.
42
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Lafferty “should not be used to create a novel theory of damages for an independent cause of
action like malpractice.”49
III. Deepening Insolvency as a Means for Measuring Damages
Other courts, however, recognize deepening insolvency as a means of measuring
damages arising from other torts.50 Although these courts do not recognize deepening insolvency
as an independent cause of action, they recognize that when a party commits an independent,
legally cognizable tort, they can be liable to the extent that the transgression led to the deepening
insolvency of the debtor.51
For example, in Federal National Mortgage Association v. Olympia Mortgage
Corporation,52 the plaintiff, “Olympia,” brought claims against the defendant Avruham Donner,
its former president and a principal shareholder, for breach of fiduciary duty, and for constructive
and actual fraudulent conveyances under New York law.53 Olympia undisputedly alleged that
Donner (and his family) directly received or benefitted from over $7,000,000.00 in assets
transferred and payments made from Olympia to the Donner family from 1998-2004, while the
company was insolvent.54 Although Donner’s family claimed that all of the transfers were part of
Donner's compensation as President, Olympia alleged that all of these transfers in question were
unwarranted, and in excess of Donner’s salary.55
49

Id.
Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., 04-CV-4971 (NG MDG), 2014 WL
2594340 1 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014).
51
Id.
52
Id.
50

53

See Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., 04-CV-4971 (NG MDG), 2014 WL 2594340 1 (E.D.N.Y.
June 10, 2014).
54

See Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
55
Id.; See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. (“Donner elected not to respond to Olympia's Proposed
Pretrial Order; he then chose not to respond to the September 11, 2013 order to show cause; and
he has now chosen not to oppose the present motion—even after requesting and receiving an
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Due to Donner’s failure to otherwise defend against Olympia’s claims, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that Olympia was entitled to entry of
default judgment against Donner under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.56 The
Olympia court, therefore, accepted all of Olympia’s allegations of fact as true, and drew all
inferences in its favor.57 The court concluded that Olympia’s submission made it clear that
Donner caused Olympia to transfer funds for less than fair consideration, while it was insolvent,
in violation of section 273 of the New York Debtor Creditor Laws and also, that Donner caused
Olympia to transfer funds to related persons and entities without fair consideration even though
Donner knew that Olympia was insolvent, and that the transfers would cause Olympia to avoid
making payments to creditors.58 The Olympia court also determined that Olympia established
that Donner owed a fiduciary duty to Olympia, that he breached this fiduciary duty by both
causing the fraudulent conveyances to be made and engaging in various schemes to disguise
Olympia’s financial conditions and that as a result of Donner’s breach, Olympia incurred
damages in the form of increased indebtedness to Olympias’s creditors.59
The court, however, was obligated, however, to inquire as to the amount of damages that
were owed by Donner because when a default judgment is warranted, the allegations in the

extension of time by which to do so. Such (in)action clearly demonstrates a failure to “otherwise
defend” against the claims Olympia has been attempting to prosecute over these past many years,
and Olympia's motion for the entry of default judgment is granted.”)
56
Id.
57
Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n., WL 2594340 at 3.
58
Id.; See also United States v. Alfano, 34 F.Supp.2d 827, 844–45 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (The court
also concluded that such transfers caused Olympia to avoid making payments to its creditors,
mainly Fannie Mae, violating Section 276 and that Donner owed a fiduciary duty to Olympia,
which he breached by causing the fraudulent transfers to be made, as well as disguising
Olympia’s true financial condition).
59
See Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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complaint, with respect to the amount of the damages are not automatically deemed true.60 This
inquiry involves two tasks: determining the proper rule for calculating damages on such a claim,
and assessing plaintiff's evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.61
In determining that deepening insolvency provided a basis for damages arising from
Donner’s breach of his fiduciary, the Olympia court stated that “deepening insolvency”
is considered ‘a basis for damages that may result from the commission of
a separate tort.’ Thus, one seeking to recover under this theory “must show
that the defendant prolonged the company's life in breach of a separate
duty, or committed an actionable tort that contributed to the continued
operation of a corporation and its increased debt.62
Therefore the Olympia court went on to conclude that Donner’s schemes amounted to a
breach of fiduciary duty and were put in place to prolong the life of an already insolvent
Olympia and increase its debts to its creditors, while simultaneously depleting the value of
Olympia’s assets available for repayment.63 Therefore, because the Olympia court was satisfied
that Olympia’s liability to its creditors was caused by Donner’s breach of his fiduciary duty, the
Olympia court granted Olympia’s motion for default judgment in the requested amount.64
IV. Not Recognizing Deepening Insolvency as Either a Separate Tort or a Basis for
Measuring Damages
Some courts disagree with the previous two lines of cases and therefore, do not recognize
the theory of “deepening insolvency” as a cause of action or as a means for measuring
damages.65 The most notable jurisdiction to refuse to recognize deepening insolvency is

60

Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n., WL 2594340 at *4.
Id.
62
Id at *7.
63
Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n., WL 2594340 at *7.
64
Id.
65
Id.
61
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Delaware.66 For example, in Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., the
Trenwick Group Inc. (“Trenwick”), a publicly-traded holding company, with five direct
subsidiaries, operated as a specialty insurance and reinsurance organization, which issued
policies around the globe.67
In 1998, Trenwick began to grow via an acquisition strategy.68 Within two years,
Trenwick acquired three unaffiliated insurance companies.69 As part of the last acquisition,
Trenwick re-domiciled to Bermuda and reorganized its subsidiaries “by national line” to reduce
its tax burdens.70 In doing so, Trenwick America, Trenwick’s top U.S. subsidiary, became the
intermediary parent of all of the other subsidiaries operating in the U.S.71 As a result, Trenwick
America was valued at over $200 million.72
In 2003, Trenwick was forced to file for bankruptcy, mainly because “the claims made by
the insureds against the holding company's operating subsidiaries (including the insureds of the
companies it had acquired) exceeded estimates and outstripped the holding company's capacity
to service the claims and its debt.”73 As a result, the Litigation Trust, which was assigned all of
the causes of action that the U.S. subsidiary owned, brought the case to the Court of Chancery of
Delaware.74 The complaint alleged several causes of actions, all of which centered on the idea

66

Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006) aff'd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). The Third Circuit had
previously ruled that the Delaware courts would recognize a separate cause of action for
deepening the insolvency. In re Exide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
This was overruled by the Delaware Chancery Court in Trenwick.
67
Id at 175.
68
Id at 172.
69
Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168, 172.
70
Id.
71
Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168, 172.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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that the debtor’s growth strategy was “irrational” and amounted to “gross negligence.” Included
among these causes of actions was a claim for supposed tort of deepening insolvency.75
The main claim was that the majority independent board of Trenwick engaged in an
irresponsible business strategy by “acquiring other insurers who had underestimated their
potential claims exposure.”76 The claim further alleges that as a result the conduct by Trenwick
caused Trenwick America to become insolvent.77 In addition, Trenwick America also took on
obligations to support Trenwick’s debt, actually assuming some of that debt, leading to an even
greater injury for itself and its creditors than was incurred by Trenwick and its creditors.78
The Delaware chancery court dismissed the litigation trust’s complaint against the former
Trenwick directors. 79 When considering the motion to dismiss, the chancery court noted that the
litigation trust failed to plead facts supporting a conclusion that Trenwick America was insolvent
prior to, or rendered insolvent by, the challenged transactions.80 Yet, the court did not dismiss the
deepening insolvency claim for that reason.81 Instead the chancery court went on to hold that
Delaware does not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action.82 The
chancery court also seems to indicate that it would not also recognize deepening insolvency as a
measurement of damages arising from a separate tort.83
In so holding, the chancery court opined that the directors of an insolvent firm “may, in
the appropriate exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out,

75

Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168, 172.
Id.
77
Trenwick 906 A.2d 168, 172.
78
Id.
79
Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168, 204.
80
Id at 174
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
76

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439

12

result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red.”84 Accordingly, the chancery court found
that the directors of an insolvent firm could cause the firm to incur more debt if they, after acting
with due diligence and good faith, conclude that such a strategy will increase the firm’s value.85
The chancery court also stated that deepening insolvency is duplicative of existing causes of
actions, such as fraud, fraudulent conveyance, and breach of contract that can be asserted to
challenge the actions of an insolvent corporation’s board.86 Finally, the court supported its
discussion by relying on the already existing Delaware law, which requires the directors of a
corporation to pursue profit for a corporation in good faith, for the corporation’s equityholders.87 The chancery court noted that this rule applies even when a firm is insolvent, provided
that the directors recognize that the firm’s creditors have become the firm’s residual claimants,
and therefore the firm’s principle objective is the advancement of their investments.88 The
chancery court conclusion in Trenwick, was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2007.89
V.

Deepening Insolvency’s Implications
The future of Deepening insolvency in the judicial system is uncertain. With all of the

competing interpretations of this theory, one is unsure as to which view will ultimately prevail.
Each interpretation has its own specific implications. (debtors, creditors, and debtors former
directors).
If deepening insolvency is deemed a separate cause of action or as a means of measuring
damages from a separate tort, many corporations may be terminated too fast. Corporate directors

84

Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168, 174.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006) aff'd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
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will have to worry about their potential liability. Corporate directors may lean towards ending an
insolvent or failing corporation when they could have salvaged corporate value, and therefore
some creditor debt, via prolonging it. Creditors will most likely be satisfied with such a ruling
because they would have someone to sue when they have been fraudulently indebted. This will
lead to creditors possibly making more deals with companies because they know that corporate
directors will be more wary of their actions, and there will be less risk of fraudulent activity. The
problem for creditors however would be that if a company was insolvent, and was indebted to
such a creditor, the corporate directors, as stated above, may end an insolvent company quicker,
without trying to salvage corporate value, and therefore salvaging some of the corporate debt. In
general, the debtors will have more faith in their directors, because the directors be potentially
liable for fraud, however, if the debtor is insolvent, and possibly could’ve been save via
prolongation, the directors may choose to terminate too quickly.
If deepening insolvency is not recognized at all, corporate directors could continue the
existence of a failing or insolvent corporation in bad faith in the hopes of making themselves as
much money as possible before it falls, and not have to worry about any potential liability. This
could lead to directors to seriously take advantage of their creditors. Creditors may be less
inclined to give out loans, or assets altogether. The terms of the deals between creditors and the
debtor corporations would most likely favor the creditors. Because the directors would have no
direct liability in regards to “deepening insolvency,” creditors may make the terms of the loans
that they lend to debtors shorter, or with higher interest rates. There is some protection for
creditors, and debtor corporations, however, because there are other causes of actions, such as
negligence, or malpractice, that can hold the directors liable for fraudulent activities. All three
theories lead to unique results, each having serious implications.
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Conclusion
Although maybe considered a lost issue, “deepening insolvency” has recently been put
back into the attention of courts. There are three approaches for applying the theory of
“deepening insolvency:” (i) separate cause of action (ii) a means of measuring damages arising
from another tort (iii) refusing to recognize “deepening insolvency” altogether. Each theory has
its own merits. Although the future of “deepening insolvency” is unknown, its permanent place
within the judicial system will most likely depend on changing corporate needs. If deepening
insolvency is deemed a separate cause of action or deemed a measurement of damages arising
from another tort, the creditors will have more protection and the corporate directors will be
more wary of their actions because they will be potentially liable. If deepening insolvency is not
recognized at all, creditors will not have a direct protection against directors who fraudulently
deepen the insolvency of the debtor corporation, and the directors will not be as cautious because
they will not have as much liability for fraudulently deepening the insolvency of the corporation.
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